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A B S T R A C T
Do attitudes towards European integration influence vote
choice in national elections – a phenomenon I refer to as
European Union (EU) issue voting? Evidence concerning EU
issue voting is thus far mixed. Some scholars conclude that
an electoral connection exists between European and
national politics, whereas others claim that European inte-
gration has had very few observable effects on national elec-
tions. A resolution emerges when the conditional nature of
EU issue voting is acknowledged. Specifically, EU issue
voting is more likely to occur in elections in which both the
extent of partisan conflict over European integration and the
degree of EU issue salience among voters are high. Using
a conditional logit model, I illustrate the conditional nature
of EU issue voting by comparing UK, Danish, Dutch and
German elections between 1992 and 2002.
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Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2005 Dutch and French referendums on the Draft
Constitutional Treaty, the discussion regarding an alleged gap between politi-
cal elites and the masses has intensified (Hooghe and Marks, 2006; Gabel and
Scheve, 2007; Steenbergen et al., 2007). With the expansion of European Union
(EU) jurisdictional authority over a range of policy areas from market inte-
gration and employment policy to foreign policy and immigration, the intro-
duction of a single currency, EU enlargement and the negotiation of a
‘Constitution’ for Europe, European integration has motored full speed
ahead. But not all citizens appear to like the speed with which or the 
direction in which the European endeavour is moving. There appears real
potential for political mobilization against the European project. Hence the
notion coined by Van der Eijk and Franklin that there is a ‘sleeping giant’ of
public opinion scepticism that could be woken up by political entrepreneurs.
This in turn could alter elections or even change the structure of domestic
political competition (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004).
Research consistent with the sleeping giant thesis demonstrates that
attitudes towards European integration are indeed capable of influencing
national vote choice (Evans, 1998, 2002; Gabel, 2000; Tillman, 2004). There is
also evidence that public opinion helps shape elite preferences concerning the
EU and vice versa (Carrubba, 2001; Steenbergen et al., 2007). This work
suggests that there is some sort of ‘electoral connection’ between European
and national politics (Carrubba, 2001). However, other scholars note that
Europeanization effects on domestic political competition are weak (Mair,
2000; Sitter, 2001; Krouwel, 2004; Van Holsteyn and Den Ridder, 2005). Mair
(2000: 31) argues that European integration has had virtually no effect on the
format of national party systems, which is echoed in the conclusion by
Krouwel (2004) that, although policy-making is increasingly supranational in
character, politics is still primarily a national affair.
What are we to make of these competing theses? In other words, do
attitudes towards European integration influence vote choice in national
elections, or not? In this article, I develop an argument that emphasizes the
conditional nature of EU issue voting. EU issue voting is defined as the
process in which attitudes towards European integration translate into
national vote choice. I argue and empirically substantiate that the level of EU
issue voting is conditional on the degree of EU issue salience among voters
and the extent of partisan conflict over Europe. Do citizens care about Europe,
and do parties provide them with meaningful choice? The available evidence
also suggests that conflict and salience are mediated by the extent to which
Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs at the ideological extremes can mobilize
the EU issue.
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This article proceeds as follows. After a brief discussion of the sleeping
giant thesis, the conceptual starting point of my argument, I theorize the
conditional nature of EU issue voting. I then highlight the role of Euro-
sceptic political entrepreneurs on the far right and far left in mobilizing the
EU issue in national electoral politics. Finally, I examine EU issue voting in
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK), which
provide sharply contrasting contexts for EU issue voting.
The conditional nature of EU issue voting
An interesting conceptual starting point for EU issue voting lies in the thesis
developed by Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004). They argue that the EU issue
presents a ‘sleeping giant’ to the extent that it divides voters without giving
them an immediate outlet in party competition.
Two elements underlie the thesis. For an issue to be a giant, EU orien-
tations of voters should resemble ‘real’ attitudes rather than random
responses; i.e. most people should have an opinion and these opinions should
exhibit some meaningful variation. If EU attitudes are ‘non-attitudes’, one
would expect to find a high number of missing values, low agreement and
low extremity (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004; see also Converse, 1964, and
Van der Eijk, 2001). The authors show that a surprisingly large proportion of
voters hold ‘real’ attitudes and display meaningful variation in EU prefer-
ences (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004: 37–8). The giant is sleeping because
voters find it impossible to express their views on Europe at the ballot box.
In most member states, inter-party competition on European integration is
much more limited than on left/right issues, whereas voters appear as
divided on Europe as on left/right issues (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004:
39–41). Thus, ‘the pro-/anti-EU orientation . . . constitutes something of a
“sleeping giant” that has the potential, if awakened, to impel voters to politi-
cal behaviour that (because of its degree of orthogonality with left/right
orientations) undercuts the bases for contemporary party mobilisation in
many, if not most, European polities’ (2004: 33).
The sleeping giant thesis assumes that EU contention is most likely to
originate from public opinion – though mediated via political entrepreneurs.
The reason for this, according to Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004), is that,
although most voters are ‘ready’ to use EU preferences, political parties for
the most part are inclined to downplay the EU issue by subsuming it into the
left/right issue. However, ‘voter readiness is not enough – some policy entre-
preneur or entrepreneurs have to come along who are willing to capitalise
these preconditions in order to win votes that otherwise would have gone
elsewhere’ (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004: 48). Voters show meaningful
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variation on the EU issue and this ‘giant’ of public Euroscepticism waits to
be exploited by political entrepreneurs.
What happens if we relax this assumption? Could not EU issue voting
emerge out of situations where inter-party conflict on European integration
precedes and provokes voter salience? This latter perspective is highlighted
in US literature on issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson, 1986, 1989;
Abramowitz, 1994; Adams, 1997; Layman and Carsey, 2002; Stimson, 2004).
The notion of issue evolution developed by Carmines and Stimson (1986,
1989) is based on the view that party elites set in motion the process by which
an issue becomes salient. The term refers to the emergence and development
of issues that invoke public interest, which under the condition of durable
divisiveness may eventually alter the link between voters and parties and
lead to mass realignment (Carmines and Stimson, 1989: 11). Carmines and
Stimson sketch a sequence explicating how elite change may result in 
electoral change.
The first step is the (re-)phrasing of a potentially contentious issue in
partisan terms. This may be triggered by strategic calculation – a situation in
which opposition parties identify a previously non-salient issue in the antici-
pation that it may help them upset an existing majority. The underlying
assumption here is that of vote maximization (Downs, 1957). But contention
may also be provoked by a ‘critical moment’ – an exogenous event – which
draws attention to an issue and which prompts partisan competition
(Carmines and Stimson, 1986: 902). Either way, the issue becomes contentious.
The second and third steps extend this to voters. Carmines and Stimson
emphasize how party priming, framing and cueing make voters aware of the
differences in party positioning on the new issue, as well as make voters care
about the issue. This is what they refer to as achieving clarity and affect (1986:
902–3). The assumption is, then, that the public will follow elites. According
to Carmines and Stimson (1986, 1989), issues are expected to gain political
relevance when both of the following conditions are met. First, there should
be conflict among parties, and this conflict should be perceived by voters
(perceived partisan conflict, or contention + clarity). Second, voters should care
about the issue (issue salience, or affect).
Carmines and Stimson’s ‘issue evolution’ perspective and Van der Eijk
and Franklin’s ‘sleeping giant’ scenario present two different pathways to EU
issue voting. The latter model presumes that EU issue voting begins with
public opinion mobilization; that is to say, when voters care about the issue,
parties will respond. EU issue voting constitutes a bottom-up phenomenon.
The former model highlights the role of political parties in driving EU issue
voting in a top-down fashion. In this case, the process starts with party
repositioning and, as parties play up their differences, voters respond.
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Despite their differences, the two perspectives share a basic insight: both
identify perceived partisan conflict and issue salience as crucial ingredients
for issue voting. I build on this to theorize that EU issue voting is likely only
to the extent that there is a combination of high perceived partisan conflict
and high issue salience regarding European integration (EU Issue Voting
Hypothesis).1 One or the other is not sufficient to trigger EU issue voting.
The role of extremist political entrepreneurs in the 
EU issue voting process
After highlighting the conditions under which EU issue voting is likely to
take place, it is important to reflect on when partisan conflict and voter
salience regarding European integration are expected to be high. Relying on
the literature on party strategy in general and on studies regarding party
positioning on European integration specifically, I suggest that Eurosceptic
parties at the political extremes are crucial in this respect.
Parties on the far right or far left have an interest in restructuring con-
testation to broaden their voter base, because their extreme position on the
left/right dimension is likely to provide a low ceiling to their support base.
As a result, these parties have an incentive ‘to find some alternative [issue]
that beats the current winner’ (Riker, 1982: 209). This may bring about an elec-
toral reorientation and thus new voters. The kinds of issues rational parties
on the extreme right and left can be expected to pick up are issues maximiz-
ing consistency with their ideological platform, while at the same time mini-
mizing positional distance with some untapped public concern (Hinich and
Munger, 1993). The EU issue could be such an issue, precisely because (a)
Euroscepticism is ideologically consistent with these parties’ more general
criticism of the political-economic status quo, and (b) public opinion is, on
average, much more Eurosceptic than mainstream elites. Hooghe (2003) refers
to this phenomenon as ‘Europe divided’. So, there is an unexploited voter
potential. All the while, opposition to European integration should enhance
extremist parties’ credibility, because it fits rather nicely in their ideological
profile (see Hinich and Munger, 1993).
The existence of an extremist, Eurosceptic political entrepreneur is not
enough, however, to raise perceived partisan conflict and voter salience
regarding European integration. Parties on the extremes of the political
spectrum have to actively play up the EU issue, i.e. they need to decide to
give the EU issue central importance in their electoral campaigns. Both
saliency theory of party competition (Budge and Farlie, 1983) and the theory
of issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996) inform us that political parties are
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compelled to pick certain core issues in their electoral campaign. By strategi-
cally emphasizing some issues and de-emphasizing others, voters come to
associate certain parties with specific issues. However, neither theory gives
us much guidance on which issues parties are likely to choose. The literature
on party positioning regarding European integration can provide some clues.
We know, for example, that mainstream parties have no incentive to play up
the EU issue because they are generally supportive of the integration process;
they have often been part of governing coalitions throughout Western Europe
and were therefore largely responsible for the course of integration. Extreme,
Eurosceptic parties, on the other hand, have an electoral incentive to play up
the EU issue (Taggart, 1998; Netjes and Binnema, 2007). Moreover, Euro-
sceptism is rooted in the partisan ideology of far left and far right parties,
albeit for different reasons. Radical right parties oppose European integration
because it erodes national sovereignty and national identity; the radical left
resists further integration in Europe owing to its neo-liberal character
(Hooghe et al., 2002; Kopecky and Mudde, 2002).
So, far left and far right political entrepreneurs have a strategic incentive
to mobilize the EU issue in order to reap electoral gains (Taggart, 1998; Van
der Eijk and Franklin, 2004). When they do so, perceived partisan conflict and
voter salience regarding European integration should rise as a result. Con-
sequently, the more the extremist parties actively play up the anti-EU card,
the higher perceived partisan conflict and issue salience can be expected to
be (Extremist Parties Hypothesis).
To sum up, two hypotheses guide the empirical analysis. First, I expect
the extent of EU issue voting to be conditional on the degree of EU issue
salience among voters and the extent of partisan conflict on Europe (EU Issue
Voting Hypothesis). Secondly, partisan conflict and issue salience are mediated
by the extent to which Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs at the ideological
extremes mobilize the EU issue (Extremist Parties Hypothesis). Before we turn
to the empirical examination of these hypotheses, let me first introduce the
data, operationalizations and methods used.
Data, operationalizations and methods
To examine the relationship between attitudes on European integration and
vote choice in national elections, I employ individual-level survey data from
the British general election surveys of 1992, 1997 and 2001, the Danish 
national election surveys of 1994, 1998 and 2001, the Dutch national election
surveys of 1994, 1998 and 2002 and the German election surveys of 1998 and
2002.2 The data show considerable variation in EU issue salience and
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perceived partisan conflict on Europe and thus provide an excellent test of
the EU Issue Voting Hypothesis. Moreover, the question wordings for the
dependent and independent variables used in the empirical analysis are very
similar across the different surveys.
The analysis proceeds in three parts. First, I determine the extent of
perceived partisan conflict and issue salience in each election. Next, I assess
the validity of the EU Issue Voting Hypothesis by examining whether EU
issue voting is indeed more extensive when partisan conflict and issue
salience are high. Finally, I evaluate the Extremist Party Hypothesis by
presenting evidence of the role of extremist political entrepreneurs in the EU
issue voting process.
What is the extent of perceived partisan conflict and issue salience regard-
ing Europe? Perceived partisan conflict is the ratio of party dispersion on EU
issues to dispersion in terms of left/right ideology, which I measure as the
standard deviation of voters’ EU and left/right party placements in the
respective national election survey data. For the UK 1992 elections, I lack
voters’ perceptions of parties’ EU positions, and so I rely on the Chapel Hill
expert survey data on party positioning on European integration to deter-
mine party positions on Europe.3 If the ratio takes on the value of 1 or higher,
then partisan conflict on EU issues is considered high. To measure EU issue
salience, I use the question from the relevant national election surveys asking
respondents to name the most important problems facing their countries.
Some scholars have questioned whether this item truly taps issue salience on
the grounds that it may conflate the importance of an issue – salience – with
the problematic nature of the same issue (Wlezien, 2005). Although this may
be a valid concern for elites or sophisticated respondents, it is not clear
whether ordinary citizens are in a position to distinguish the most important
issues – that is, high up on the priority list – from the most problematic – that
is, difficult to solve by public policy.
The second part of the empirical analysis examines the extent of EU issue
voting. In order to do this, I employ a conditional logit regression model.
Since my dependent variable is a categorical variable with multiple values,
i.e. vote choice for different parties, I need to address several methodological
concerns (see Alvarez and Nagler, 1998; Agresti, 2002). First, since the prob-
ability of voting for a party can vary only between 0 and 1, ordinary least
squares regression analysis is ruled out. Moreover, because I am interested in
how the characteristics of parties (i.e. their positions on European integration
relative to voter positions) influence vote choice within a spatial framework,
I use a conditional logit rather than a multinomial logit model (see Alvarez
and Nagler, 1998). The multinomial logit model focuses on information about
individual voters rather than issue positions of parties and/or candidates and
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is therefore less suitable for modelling electoral behaviour in a spatial setting.
The conditional logit model, on the other hand, allows for the examination
of both party and respondent positions on a given issue.4 The model consists
of four predictors: the distance between a respondent’s self-placement and a
party’s position on European integration (EU issue distance), left/right, immi-
gration policy and environmental policy scales. I also include several socio-
economic control variables, such as gender, religiosity, income and education.
The dependent variable is the vote choice of respondents in a given parlia-
mentary election. To construct the EU distance variable – the crown indepen-
dent variable – I subtract a respondent’s self-placement from a respondent’s
party-placement on an EU scale for each individual party. I then square this
distance to derive an Euclidean distance measure. Respondents were asked
to place themselves, as well as several political parties, on a five-point
European integration scale, where 1 stands for exit from the EU and 5 stands
for the fastest possible build-up of the EU. Voters are expected to choose the
party that most accurately resembles their EU positions, i.e. the smallest
distance hypothesis.5 So, if EU issue voting occurs, the effect of EU issue distance
should be negative and significant. In other words, an increase in disagree-
ment between a respondent’s EU position and a party’s EU position should
lead to a decrease in the likelihood of the respondent voting for the party.
To assess the importance of the EU issue in relation to other concerns, I
also include three non-EU-related policy variables (left/right and two new
politics policies, namely immigration and environmental policy). Each is
constructed in the same manner as EU issue distance.6 Table 1 summarizes the
operationalizations of the variables employed in the conditional logit
regression analysis.
In the third and final step of the empirical analysis, I evaluate the role
of extremist political entrepreneurs in the EU issue voting process. The
parties included are both Eurosceptic and extremist in terms of left/right
positioning. Left or right extremist parties are those parties that are one
standard deviation below or above the mean left/right ideological position
of all parties in a country. Eurosceptic parties are those parties that are one
standard deviation below the mean position on European integration for all
parties in a country. The parties’ left/right and EU positions are based on
the respondents’ party-placements included in the respective national
election surveys, with the exception of EU positions in the 1992 UK election,
for which I used the Chapel Hill expert survey data on party positioning.
I argued above that the mere presence of an extremist, Eurosceptic politi-
cal entrepreneur is not enough; these parties have to actively play up the EU
issue in their electoral campaigns. To get a sense of the importance of the EU
issue for extremist, Eurosceptic parties I use the Chapel Hill expert survey
European Union Politics 8(3)3 7 0
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Table 1 Description of dependent and independent variables
Dependent variable
Vote choice Vote choice for a particular party in a given election.
Independent variables
EU distance Operationalized by subtracting a respondent’s self-placement
from a respondent’s party-placement on a five-point
European integration scale (where 1 stands for exit out of the
EU and 5 stands for the fastest possible build-up of the EU)
for each party. I then squared this distance to derive an
Euclidian distance measure.
(0 = high correspondence between self- and party-placement;
16 = low correspondence between self- and party-placement).
Left/right distance Operationalized by subtracting a respondent’s self-placement
from a respondent’s party-placement on a five-point 
left/right ideological scale (where 1 indicates left and 5
indicates right) for each party. I then squared this distance to
derive an Euclidian distance measure.
(0 = high correspondence between self- and party-placement;
16 = low correspondence between self- and party-placement).
Immigration distance Operationalized by subtracting a respondent’s self-placement
from a respondent’s party-placement on a five-point
immigration scale (where 1 indicates restrict immigration and
5 indicates welcome more immigrants) for each party. I then
squared this distance to derive an Euclidian distance measure.
(0 = high correspondence between self- and party-placement;
16 = low correspondence between self- and party-placement).
Not included in the British election surveys.
Environment distance Operationalized by subtracting a respondent’s self-placement
from a respondent’s party-placement on a five-point
environment scale (where 1 indicates not very green policy
and 5 indicates green policy) for each party. I then squared
this distance to derive an Euclidian distance measure.
(0 = high correspondence between self- and party-placement;
16 = low correspondence between self- and party-placement).
Not included in the British election surveys.
Gender Respondent’s gender (1 = female; 0 = male).
Religiosity Respondent’s church attendance (1 = high; 0 = low).
Not included in the Danish and 1992 and 2001 British election
surveys.
Income Respondent’s household income (1 = high; 0 = low).
Education Respondent’s level of education (1 = high; 0 = low).
data on party positioning on European integration. In these surveys, experts
were asked to evaluate the relative importance of the EU issue to the 
party’s public stance on a five-point scale, where 1 indicates that European
integration is of no importance to the party and 5 signifies that European
integration is the most important issue for the party (in 2002 EU issue salience
was measured on a 4-point scale, in order to guarantee comparability across
surveys, the 2003 item was recoded to a 5-point scale).
Empirical analysis
Let me begin by determining the extent of perceived partisan conflict and
issue salience regarding European integration in the UK, Danish, Dutch and
German elections. Table 2 compares the perceived degree of conflict among
parties over the EU issue relative to that in terms of left/right ideology for
the 11 elections. I measure perceived partisan conflict by the ratio of the
standard deviation of party positions on European integration and the
standard deviation of party positions on the left/right dimension as perceived
by voters. A value above 1 means that, in the eyes of the voters, parties
diverge more on European integration than on left/right issues.
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Table 2 Partisan conflict on left/right and pro-/anti-EU dimensions
Party Party 
Election dispersion on dispersion on Ratio
Country year left/right pro-/anti-EU measure
Denmark 1994 0.92 0.94 1.02
1998 0.80 1.08 1.35
2001 0.73 1.00 1.37
Germany 1998 0.81 0.43 0.53
2002 0.90 0.46 0.51
Netherlands 1994 0.74 0.25 0.33
1998 0.65 0.21 0.32
2002 0.64 0.50 0.78
United Kingdom 1992 0.76 0.76 1.00
1997 0.72 1.10 1.52
2001 0.60 1.15 2.65
Notes: The ratio measure is constructed by dividing the party dispersion on the pro-/anti-EU
dimension by the party dispersion on left/right. Values of 1 and above indicate high partisan
conflict, whereas a value below 1 signifies low partisan conflict on the EU dimension.
Source: National election surveys.
The differences between the cases are considerable. For the UK and
Danish elections, the ratio of European integration versus left/right equals or
even exceeds 1. This suggests that UK and Danish parties represent a broad
range of opinions on Europe – as broad, and sometimes broader, than on the
classic left/right dimension. That is not at all true for German and Dutch
elections, with the partial exception of the Dutch 2002 elections.
These data are consistent with what we know about UK, Danish, Dutch
and German politics. European integration has caused major disagreement in
the Danish and UK party system and tensions in several major political
parties, especially within the Danish Social Democrats and the UK Con-
servatives (Worre, 1996; Berrington and Hague, 1998). In Denmark, closely
contested referendums on EU issues, of which there have been six so far, have
deepened party divisions on Europe (Buch and Hansen, 2002). The ‘no’ camp
has mainly framed its opposition in terms of the danger of a small country
being swallowed by a big EU; the EU is developing into a ‘super state and
Denmark would soon become a municipality of Europe’ (Friis, 1998: 2). For
example, the Danish People’s Party (Danske Folkeparti – DF) voiced its oppo-
sition to the Amsterdam Treaty in the 1998 campaign by using the slogan
‘vote Danish, vote no’. Although two-thirds of UK voters supported member-
ship in the European Economic Community in 1975, public and party-based
Euroscepticism has been on the rise ever since (Spiering, 2004). Opposition
towards Europe in UK party politics is especially associated with right-wing
factions within the Conservative Party, which are concerned about UK
sovereignty in the context of further European integration (Marks and Wilson,
2000; Gifford, 2006).
The EU issue generated much less partisan conflict in Dutch and German
politics. Dutch and German citizens and political parties have long been
regarded as Euro-enthusiasts. Opposition to further European integration was
seen as ‘not done’. Recently, however, this traditional attitude of consent has
given way to moderate Euroscepticism (Busch and Knelangen, 2004;
Thomassen, 2005). Although German political parties have so far not
exploited this change in mood, Dutch political parties, especially those on the
extreme right, seem increasingly willing to play up anti-EU sentiment (Lees,
2001; Pellikaan and Brandsma, 2005). In the mid-1990s, the parliamentary
leader of the Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie – VVD),
Frits Bolkestein, challenged the Dutch consensus by expressing reservations
regarding the integration process. Bolkestein opposed further political inte-
gration and felt, like many other Conservative leaders in Europe, that
integration should remain primarily economic (Harmsen, 2004). Although
this view was not shared by all VVD parliamentarians, Bolkestein’s dissent
opened the door for other parties to become more openly Eurosceptic. As
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Table 2 shows, perceived inter-party conflict regarding the EU almost doubled
between the 1998 and 2002 elections. This change is primarily due to the
Eurosceptic position of the List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn – LPF)
(Pellikaan and Brandsma, 2005).
What about EU issue salience in public opinion? Figure 1 compares
salience in UK, Danish, Dutch and German elections. EU issue salience is
measured with a question asking respondents to name the most important
issues facing their country. This is a tough question, because it requires voters
to weigh the relative importance of the EU against other pressing issues. One
would not expect many voters to see the EU as one of the most important
issues in national elections. Still, in the United Kingdom no less than 8.8% in
1997 and as much as 10.9% in 2001 viewed issues regarding European inte-
gration as important to their country. This percentage was lower in the 1992
campaign. In Denmark, too, about 4.5% of voters saw European integration
and the euro as important issues for their country in 1994 and 1998. In contrast
to Denmark and the United Kingdom, issue salience in Germany and the
Netherlands has been consistently low. Recent studies show that European
integration was virtually absent from Dutch and German electoral campaigns
(see Poguntke, 1998, 2003; Thomassen et al., 2000; Van Holsteyn and Den
Ridder, 2005).
In line with the EU Issue Voting Hypothesis, I would expect EU issue
voting to be most extensive in the three UK and Danish elections, owing to
the relatively high level of perceived partisan conflict and EU issue salience
European Union Politics 8(3)3 7 4
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Figure 1 EU issue salience.
Notes: Question wording used: ‘What is the most important problem facing the nation today?’
Values indicate the percentage of voters indicating that issues regarding European integration or
the euro constitute the most important problem facing their country.
Sources: National election surveys.
among voters. In the German and Dutch elections, however, both partisan
conflict and public opinion salience remain low. Hence, in these elections, I
expect voters to base their vote choice on considerations other than EU pref-
erences. The Dutch 2002 election is interesting because, with the electoral
debut of the Pim Fortuyn movement, partisan conflict regarding European
integration almost doubled compared with 1998. However, left/right conflict
still clearly surpassed conflict over European integration and EU issue
salience among the Dutch electorate remained very low, and so I predict no
EU issue voting in this election.
Do the expectations about the degree of EU issue voting correspond to
reality? Table 3 presents the key results of the conditional logit regression
analyses. The reader is referred to a web appendix for detailed results.7
EU issue voting exists in all three elections in Denmark and the United
Kingdom, but not in the Dutch and German elections. In the Dutch and
German elections, the coefficient of the EU issue distance variable is not
significant. In UK and Danish elections, in contrast, the overall effect of the
proximity between voters and parties in terms of the EU issue on national
vote choice is negative and significant. In other words, an increase in diver-
gence between a respondent’s and a party’s EU position leads to a decrease
in the likelihood of the respondent voting for the party. More specific
interpretations of these results are possible by examining the odds ratios
reported in Table 3 (Agresti, 2002; Long and Freese, 2006). The odds ratio
refers to the change in the odds of the outcome for a unit increase in the
predictor. Note that an odds ratio greater than 1 indicates a positive relation-
ship, an odds ratio smaller than 1 indicates a negative relationship; and an
odds ratio of 1 indicates no relationship. Odds ratios can be expressed as
percent changes by using the following formula: 100*(odds ratio – 1).8
In the case of the 1994 Danish election, the percentage by which the odds
of voting for a party change for a unit increase in EU issue distance amounts
to –14%, i.e. 100*(0.86 – 1), while for a unit increase in left/right issue
distance the odds decrease by –69%. For the 2001 Danish election, the change
in the odds of voting for a party as a result of a unit increase in EU issue
distance is, at –5%, lower than in 1994. This is not surprising in light of the
fact that Figure 1 has already indicated that the salience of the EU issue was
lower in the 2001 election campaign compared with the 1994 election.
The change in the odds of voting for a party as a result of a unit increase
in EU issue distance is of similar magnitude across the three UK elections.
The percentage change in the odds is –16% in 1992, –15% in 1997 and –13%
in 2001. The UK results also show that, similar to the Danish results, the effect
of the left/right distance on vote choice is clearly higher than the effect of the
EU issue distance. The percentage change in odds of voting for a party as a
de Vries Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale? 3 7 5
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result of a unit increase in left/right issue distance is –34% in 1992 and even
larger in the 2001 UK election, namely –43%. This is not surprising because
previous research tells us that the left/right dimension is the main predictor
of vote choice (Van der Eijk and Niemöller, 1983; Van der Eijk et al., 1999).
The results indicate that the EU issue contributes significantly to an
explanation of voting behaviour in Danish and UK elections. This finding is
consistent with my conjectures and is robust even when controlling for other
factors influencing vote choice, such as attitudes on left/right issues, immi-
gration and the environment as well as education, income and religion.9 Thus,
the EU issue contributes significantly to voting behaviour and does so
independently from the left/right dimension and new politics. Moreover, the
results signify that EU issue voting is absent from elections in which EU issue
salience and perceived conflict regarding Europe are low. In Dutch and
German elections, EU issue distance does not significantly contribute to our
understanding of voting behaviour. Hence, the findings laid out in Table 3
support the EU Issue Voting Hypothesis.
An additional way of testing the validity of the EU Issue Voting
Hypothesis is to compare associations between the extent of EU issue voting
and the extent to which an election fits the EU issue voting conditions, that
is to say, where perceived partisan conflict and issue salience reinforce each
other. I measure the extent of EU issue voting in terms of the relative improve-
ment in R2, i.e. the increase in explained variance when the EU issue distance
variable is added to the base conditional logit regression model. There is a
strong association between the extent of EU issue voting and the extent of
partisan conflict and issue salience (operationalized as an interaction of the
two), namely r = .88, which is significant at the p ≤ .001 level (two-tailed).
Now we know when (i.e. under which conditions) EU issue voting is
likely to occur, but are still left with the question of why perceived partisan
conflict and issue salience regarding European integration varies across elec-
tions. Above I highlighted the crucial role of Eurosceptic political entrepre-
neurs on the left and right extremes. Figure 2 summarizes the EU issue
salience for Eurosceptic left and right extremist parties in Denmark, Germany,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom from 1992 to 2002. EU issue salience
ranges from 1 (‘low salience’) to 3 (‘an important issue’) to 5 (’most import-
ant issue’).
The parties included are both Eurosceptic and extremist in terms of
left/right positioning. Recall that, for left/right extremism, I use the follow-
ing criterion: parties that are one standard deviation below or above the mean
left/right ideological position of all parties in a country as well as one
standard deviation below the mean position on European integration for all
parties in a country. Figure 2 includes the usual suspects such as the Danish
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People’s Party (DF) or the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). The UK Conservative Party
is also classified as an extremist, Eurosceptic party, which is consistent with
the criteria I use to identify such parties. It is openly Eurosceptic and it is also
more than one standard deviation to the right of the median party position
on the left/right dimension.
Whereas UK and Danish extremist, Eurosceptic parties clearly view the
EU issue as important, Dutch and German extremist political entrepreneurs
do not. The level of EU issue salience of the extremist, Eurosceptic parties in
the Netherlands and Germany between 1992 and 2002 is well below 3, indi-
cating that the issue is not important for the public stance of these parties.
The salience of the EU issue to extremist, Eurosceptic political parties is quite
highly correlated with perceived partisan conflict on Europe and EU issue
salience in the election as a whole, with r = .64 and r = .58 respectively
(significant at the p ≤ .005 level two-tailed). Figure 2 highlights the fact that,
in elections in which EU issue voting exists (that is, in the UK and Danish
elections), extremist, Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs actively play up the
EU issue, whereas in those elections in which EU issue voting is absent 
(i.e. the Dutch and German elections) extremist parties refrain from doing
so. Incidentally, the UK and Denmark are also the countries where parties
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Figure 2 EU issue salience of Eurosceptic extremist parties.
Notes: Question wording used: ‘What is the relative importance of the European integration issue
in the party’s [list of parties] public stance in [year]?’ Issue salience ranges from 1 = low to 5 = high.
List of parties: EL: Enhedslisten (Unity List); SF: Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People’s Party);
FrP: Fremskridtspartiet (Progress Party); DF: Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party); CON:
Conservative Party; PDS: Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism);
LPF: Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn); SP: Socialistische Parij (Socialist Party).
Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey on party positioning regarding European integration, 1992–2002.
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on the left and right extremes can tap into a particularly large reservoir of
Euroscepticism.
A more rigorous examination of the role of extremist, Eurosceptic
political entrepreneurs is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the initial
findings presented above are in line with the Extremist Parties Hypothesis
and show that extremist, Eurosceptic parties may indeed play a crucial role
in increasing public salience or mobilizing partisan conflict regarding
European integration.
Concluding remarks
When might European integration influence national elections? This article
has explored the potential for EU contestation in UK, Danish, Dutch and
German general elections in the 1990s and early 2000s. The article argues and
empirically substantiates that the extent of EU issue voting is conditional
upon the salience of the issue for voters and the extent of partisan conflict.
Both conditions, I argue, are open to manipulation by political parties,
especially political entrepreneurs on the far right or far left of the political
spectrum. In some countries (such as the Netherlands and Germany), voters
do not care about the European integration issue and political parties do not
compete on the issue; thus, we find no evidence of EU issue voting. In other
countries (such as Denmark and the United Kingdom), issue salience and
partisan conflict regarding European integration are high and EU preferences
have influenced national vote choice.
The double-barrelled conditional nature of EU issue voting is clearly high-
lighted in the 2002 Dutch election. Even though partisan conflict over
European integration nearly doubled in 2002 compared with 1998, this increase
did not result in EU issue voting because the European issue does not (yet?)
stir Dutch voters. As long as the public does not care about Europe, Europe
is not going to bite in national elections. But this situation is not cast in stone:
a political entrepreneur seeking to shift domestic debate away from left/right
issues and utilizing growing discontent regarding Europe may change that.
Of course, this study has limitations. First of all, although it shows that
EU issue voting varies with characteristics of the electoral environment 
(i.e. partisan conflict and issue salience), the current design does not allow me
to control for other national-level characteristics. For example, a recent study
using a multi-level approach to explain variation in economic voting demon-
strates the importance of party system characteristics (Duch and Stevenson,
2005). Could this also be the case for EU issue voting? Future research into EU
issue voting should try to examine the multi-level nature of the EU issue voting
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process and, if data availability allows, by using multi-level analysis
techniques. Secondly, a comprehensive understanding of EU issue voting
requires one to disaggregate country patterns to discern fine-grained patterns.
Hence, in future research it will be important to investigate variation in EU
issue voting across parties and voters. Finally, I have suggested that the key
to understanding why conflict and salience vary may lie in the extent to which
Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs on the right and left extremes mobilize the
EU issue. Preliminary results support this viewpoint, but they need to be
confirmed in future research. For now, the findings lend credence to Van der
Eijk and Franklin’s idea that the sleeping giant of Euroscepticism may be
woken up by political entrepreneurs. I suspect the princes to be of radical left
or radical right lineage.
Notes
I am grateful to the Danish Data Archive, the Dutch Data Archiving and Network-
ing Services, the Zentral Archiv für Empirische Sozialforschung and the UK Data
Archive for making available the data used in this study. I am also indebted to
Harmen Binnema, Erica Edwards, Lawrence Ezrow, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly,
Gary Marks, Marco Steenbergen, Barbara Vis, Tijmen de Vries and three anony-
mous reviewers as well as the editor of EUP for their insightful comments on
earlier drafts of this article. Remaining errors are my sole responsibility.
1 In her work on the electoral success of niche parties, Bonnie Meguid (2005)
also highlights the importance of partisan conflict and issue salience. She
argues that niche parties (i.e. green and far right) are more likely to be
electorally successful when mainstream parties engage them on their favourite
policy issue and, by doing so, presumably increase its salience, and when they
take competing positions on this issue.
2 The 1994 German election and the 2003 Dutch election could not be added
to the analysis, because these election surveys do not contain questions
regarding EU issues. The analysis presented in this article is based on data
from the following surveys: 1. Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 1994, primary
investigators: Kees Aarts, Hans Anker, Joop van Holsteyn, Erik Oppenhuis,
Paul Pennings and Karin Wittebrood, P1209, Steinmetz Archief, 1995; 
2. Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 1998, primary investigators: Kees Aarts, Henk
Van der Kolk and Jacques Thomassen, P1415, Steinmetz Archief, 1999; 
3. Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 2002, primary investigators: Galen A. Irwin,
Joop J.M. Van Holsteyn and Josje M. Den Ridder, P1628, Steinmetz Archief,
2004; 4. Valgundersøgelsen 1994, primary investigators: Jørgen Goul
Andersen and Ole Borre, DDA-2210, Odense, Danish Data Archive, 2002; 
5. Valgundersøgelsen 1998, primary investigators: Jørgen Goul Andersen,
Johannes Andersen, Ole Borre and Hans Jørgen Nielsen, DDA-4189, Odense,
Danish Data Archive, 1999; 6. Valgundersøgelsen 2001, primary investigators:
Jørgen Goul Andersen, Ole Borre, Hans Jørgen Nielsen, Johannes Andersen,
Søren Risbjerg, Jacques Thomassen and Jørgen Elklit, DDA-12516, Odense,
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Danish Data Archive, 2003; 7. Politische Einstellungen, politische Partizi-
pation und Wählerverhalten im vereinigten Deutschland 1998, primary
investigators: Oscar W. Gabriel, Jurgen W. Falter and Hans Rattinger, 
ZA-3066, Zentral Archiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 1998; 8. Politische
Einstellungen, politische Partizipation und Wählerverhalten im vereinigten
Deutschland 2002, primary investigators: Oscar W. Gabriel, Jurgen W. Falter
and Hans Rattinger, ZA-3861, Zentral Archiv für Empirische Sozialforschung,
2002; 9. British General Election Study 1992, primary investigators: Anthony
Heath, Roger Jowell, John K. Curtice, Jack A. Brand and James C. Mitchell,
SN 2981, UK Data Archive, 1993; 10. British General Election Study 1997,
primary investigators: Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell, John K. Curtice and
Pippa Norris, SN 3887, UK Data Archive, 1999; 11. British General Election
Study 2001, primary investigators: Howard Clark, David Sanders, Marianne
Stewart and Paul F. Whiteley, SN 4619, UK Data Archive, 2003.
3 The Chapel Hill expert survey data on party positioning on European
integration are downloadable from: http://www.unc.edu/%7Ehooghe/
parties.htm. I cross-validated the voters’ and experts’ judgements of party
positions on an EU scale for the 1997 and 2001 UK data, the 1994, 1998 and
2001 Danish data, the 1994, 1998 and 2002 Dutch data and the 1998 and 2002
German data and found that these measures correlate at the .80 level or higher
(for a more in-depth cross-validation of voters’ and experts’ judgements of EU
party positioning, see Marks et al., 2007).
4 One potential problem with a conditional logit model is the independence
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. IIA means that the ratio of the
choice probabilities for two alternatives, A and B, is independent from all
other alternatives in the choice set (see Agresti, 2002). I computed a Hausman
test statistic for the respective elections, which demonstrated that the IIA
assumption seems reasonable.
5 This expectation builds on the proximity model developed by Enelow and
Hinich (1984). This model assumes that voters act rationally and vote on the
basis of policy outcomes that they associate with the future government. An
alternative conceptualization of issue voting is the directional voting model
by Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989), who include direction and intensity
in conceptualizing the distance between voters and parties. Since not all
election studies provide the information needed to construct distances on the
basis of the directional model, I use the proximity model.
6 I use voters’ and parties’ placements on nuclear energy in German and Dutch
surveys to tap into the environment issue. The original coding of voter and
party placements on the EU, immigration and environment issue in the Dutch
and German election studies was based on a 7-point scale. In order to guaran-
tee comparability across the different countries, these items were recoded to
a 5-point scale. The original 10-point scales of left/right voter and party place-
ments for the UK, Danish, Dutch and German studies were collapsed into a
5-point scale. Different permutations of rescaling do not affect the results.
7 The web appendix is available at http://www.uni-konstanz.de/eup/
issues.htm.
8 The odds ratio is defined as exp(b); see Agresti (2002).
9 There is no evidence of multicollinearity. I calculated the variance inflation
factors (VIF) for the several analyses. First, I performed auxiliary regressions,
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then I computed the separate VIF scores using the following formula: 
1/(1 – R2). The VIF scores are below 1.23 (the VIF for the conditional logit
regression model of the 2001 Danish election was the highest at 1.23). This
finding is in line with correlation analyses, which demonstrated that the
correlations between the predictors were well below .30, which is clearly
below the critical value of .80.
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